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ABSTRACT 
Theoretically, corporate restructuring is meant to remove firms' operating and 
financial constraints and improve jimz perfonnance. However, corporate 
restructuring announcement might be interpreted differently by the market. 
Using event-study method, this study examines the impact of corporate 
restructuring announcements made by selected ./inns on their stock prices. 
Overall, the effect of the restructuring announcements, made by these companies 
on stock prices was significant while the average two years of return on total 
assets and return on operating cash flow in the post restructuring period were 
mixed. Evidence also indicates that debt reduction, refocusing and alignment 
of interest between management and shareholders through board of directors' 
ownership do not constitute the main focus for some finns in the post 
restructuring period. 
ABSTRAK 
Secara teori, penstrukturan semula bertujuan untuk mengalihkan kekangan 
kewangan dan meningkatkan prestasi firma. Bagaimanapun, pengumuman 
penstrukturan semula mungkin ditafsirkan berbeza~beza oleh pasaran. 
Menggunakan kaedah kajian peristiwa, kajian ini mengkaji impak pengumuman 
penstrukturan semula oleh beberapa firma terpilih. Secara keseluruhan, 
pengumuman~pengumuman semula yang dibuat oleh firma~finna tersebut 
tidak memberi kesan signifikan ke atas harga saham manakala purata dua 
tahun pulangan atas aset dan alirtunai operasi selepas pengumuman adalah 
bercampur~campur. Bukti juga menunjukkan pengurangan hutang, pemfokusan 
semula dan pelarasan kepentingan antara pengurusan dan pernegang~pemegang 
saham melalui pemilikan saham ahli lembaga pengarah tidak menjadi fokus 
utama beberapa finna selepas penstrukturan semula. 
STUDY BACKGROUND 
The financial cnSIS in 1997 had largely affected the current economic 
scenario that caused many finns in Malaysia to experience difficult time in 
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their business operations and financial position due to rising interest rates, 
depreciating Ringgit against foreign currencies and declining share values. 
Following the financial crisis, the number of finns that defaulted or undergoing 
restructuring and the amount of debt involved in debt restructuring increased 
sharply. However, it can be argued that firms restructure for several reasons 
such as poor corporate governance, overdiversification and overleveraging. 
In Malaysia, some finns had undertaken debt restructuring before the 
financial crisis but the financial crisis in July 1997 escalated the amount of 
restructured debt and number of firms involved in debt restructuring. 
Previous studies argue that corporate restructuring is meant to correct firm 
specific characteristics due to overdiversification, poor corporate governance 
and overleveraging. In other words, the firm's characteristics such as 
ownership structure, level of diversification and debt ratio affect the finn's 
decision to undergo corporate restructuring. Rationally, corporate restructuring 
will give meaning when firms make adjustments or corrections on specific 
characteristics that exhibit weak governance, over diversification and high 
leveraging to improve performance. Therefore do characteristics of the firm 
such as ownership structure, level of diversification and debt ratio differ 
before and after corporate restructuring to reflect the corporate restructuring 
motive? Does corporate restructuring announcement affect stock price and 
motivate the finn towards improved accounting perfonnance? 
REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING PERFORMANCE 
Corpora~e restructuring perfonnance is measured in the fonn of market 
perfonnance and accounting performance (Bowman ei a!. 1999). In the 
strand of literature that uses market perfonnance, Markides (1992) examined 
whether the market value of firms that had refocused increases surrounding 
their refocusing announcement. He found that over diversified firms that 
made refocusing announcements consistently created statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns. His study also implies that there is a limit to how 
much a firm can diversify and firms that go beyond this limit will suffer 
value decline. John and Ofek (1995) found that sell-offs' CAR are larger if 
the parent is selling a division that is unrelated to the core industry of the 
parent and are driven by a desire for parent firms to increase focus. 
In another strand of literature that uses accounting ratios, Markides 
(1995) investigated why finns reduce their diversification by refocusing on 
their core businesses and found that refocusing is associated ex post with 
profitability improvements. Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) find that both 
profitability and cash flows of 297 UK finns which adopted different 
restructuring strategies decline significantly in the decline year while Daley, 
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Mehorotra and Siva Kumar (1997) showed that the announcement period 
return of asset sales and the post issue operating perfonnance of spin offs 
are higher when the parent and subsidiary have different SIC code. Zhao 
(1998) finds that refocused firms experience higher post-period performance 
than non-refocused firms for an perfonnance measures. Sell-off aimed at 
increasing focus is also followed by improvements in profitability for the 
remaining business of the parent. 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Ownership structure may involve the distribution of the firm's shares to the 
managers or directors of the firm. Shareholders depend on managers to 
maximize their wealth. However, maximization of managers' wealth rather 
than shareholders' wealth will likely dominate the firm's management 
actions at the expense of shareholders. The agency costs arise when managers 
act as the agent rather than owner. The problem of agency cost associated 
with the divergence of interest between shareholders and managers has been 
researched numerously (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Morek et a1. 1988). In 
other words, lack of managerial incentives and divergence of interest 
between managers and ownership tends to lead to poor governance. 
Board of directors' ownership is a result of the alignment of interest 
between existing management and existing shareholders as board of director 
tum to act as the owner-manager of the firm. If agency theory predicts that 
corporate restructuring is partially to improve corporate govern.ance, board of 
directors' ownership presence is expected to align the interest of managers and 
shareholders following debt restructuring, thus reducing the agency problem. 
Therefore, finns with board of directors' ownership are less likely to restructure 
because they have been efficiently configured. With regards to the relationship 
between ownership structure and corporate restructuring, Gibbs (1993) found 
that finns with strong board powers are less likely to restructure, or at least, 
restructure less. Meanwhile, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) studied the effects 
of ownership structure on corporate restructuring on a sample of 93 surviving 
public Fortune sao firms during the period of 1981-1987. They find no 
evidence of either insider owners or institutional investors except for block 
share ownership on the association with the corporate restructuring. Lai and 
Sudarsanarn (1997) finds that the dominated manager-owner firms are more 
likely to choose capital expenditure and less interested to pursue operational 
restructuring, acquisitions and managerial restructuring. 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND DIVERSIFICATION 
According to agency theory argument, the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders exist when managers link personal incentives 
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such as power and job security with fInn size. The managerial incentives 
become higher as the firm becomes larger. Another argument is that 
managers with excess cash view diversification as a means for firm to grow 
beyond limited opportunities in their core businesses. Thus, the manager 
chooses to diversify to enlarge firm size though this diversification strategy 
destroys shareholder value when firms aTe diversified beyond optimal limit 
(Markides 1992). 
Amihud and Lev (1999) also relate the potentially detrimental effect of 
agency problems on corporate strategy to generally result in corporate 
diversification and value loss while focusing is value increasing. Mitton 
(2002) suggests that the lower transparency of diversified firms in emerging 
markets results in a higher level of asymmetric information that may allow 
managers or controlling shareholders to more easily take advantage of 
minority shareholders. 
As a result of the diminishing effect of past diversification strategy on 
firm value, a firm chooses to undergo corporate restructuring to correct past 
mistake in the diversification strategy. Among the methods used to correct 
the negative effect of diversification is by divesting unrelated business and 
refocus on a finn's business portfolio around it's core capabilities (see Gibbs 
1993; Markides 1990). Weston et al. (2001) also argued that refocusing will 
make it easier for the managers to monitor and make better decisions when 
the firm's business is more narrowly positioned 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND LEVERAGE 
Previous studies on the relation between a firm's capital structure and 
corporate restructuring have documented mixed evidence. Jensen (1989) 
examined the link between a firm's capital structure and restructuring. The 
author finds that highly leveraged firms are more likely to restructure their 
debt as firm value falls. Ofek (1993) tested the relation between capital 
structure and a firm's response to short-term financial distress. He finds that 
high leverage also significantly increases the probability of debt restructuring 
following a short period of distress. 
Consistent with Jensen (1989), Ofek (1993) also found that higher 
leverage also significantly increases the probability that some operational 
actions such as asset restructuring and employee lay-off will be taken in the 
year of distress. However, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) find no relation 
between leverage and debt restructuring following a long period of distress. 
The rate of filing for bankruptcy is higher for firms experiencing along 
period of distress than a short period of distress and leverage has no effect 
on management turnover for firm in a short period of distress but has an 
effect in along period of distress; highly pre-distressed leveraged firms react 
faster to a decline in performance than do less pre-distressed leveraged firms 
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that experience short periods of distress. Thus, the presence of debt allows 
firms to some extent to avoid along period of losses with no response and 
provide positive elements through a disciplining and monitoring action. In 
a similar study, they also find that firms with a high ratio of bank debt are 
more likely to successfully restructure their debt. Other studies (Denis & 
Shome 2005; Lang et al. 1995; Markides & Singh 1997; Steiner 1997) that 
discussed on the association between leverage and corporate restructuring. 
Theoretically, when the debt level is beyond its optimal ratio, the benefits 
of using debt (in particular tax-shield) are offset by the rising bankruptcy 
related costs. In the worst scenario due to the constraints imposed by the 
bankruptcy costs, the firms will be forced to liquidate. Therefore, the firms 
would restructure their debts when they are experiencing debt servicing 
problem due to escalating debt amount and interest commitment. 
METHODOLOGY 
Four cases of involuntary corporate restructuring of Bursa Malaysia listed 
firms namely, Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB) Group, 
uEM-Renong Group, Lion Group and Time Engineering constitute our 
interest in this study. 
These four group of companies are selected on the basis of: 
1. Their corporate restructuring scheme announcements are viewed to be 
comprehensive involving organisational restructuring, portfolio or asset 
restructuring and financial restructuring. It is documented that different 
types of restructuring may give a different impact on firm's performance. 
Thus, a study having all firms with a comprehensive restructuring 
scheme will be unbiased in relation to the restructuring outcomes. 
2. They are among major listed firms in the Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index (KLCl) and their restructuring involved a considerably large 
amount of financial outlay. 
We follow the two different measurements discussed in Bowman et al. 
(1999) to measure the corporate restructuring outcome. We calculate the 
abnormal movements in the firm's stock price in the days after a restructuring 
announcement to measure the market performance. The abnormal returns 
reflect changes in a company's share price, adjusted for market trends that 
can be attributed to the restructuring event. 
Data for the daily prices and KLCI (Kuala Lumpur Composite Index) 
price index for the event windows for the period of 2000-2003 are downloaded 
from the Datastream. This study uses the daily stock return of the 13 
companies for the period of 30 days before announcement (-30,0), during 
announcement (-1,+1) and 30 days after announcement (0,+30). 
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To determine whether the announcements convey information to the 
market, cumulative abnormal returns (CARS) are calculated based on the 
simplified market model which constraints alpha and beta to 0 and l. 
In determining the CARs we follow the standard market model event 
study which contrains ex and ~ to equal to 0 and I, respectively such that RM " (the KLCI) is company ith's expected return, Thus, the abnormal return 
(AR,) for company i is the difference between the actual return on day t and 
its expected return (RM,,)' 
ARj,1 ;;:: Ri,1 - (RM,,) 
where the daily returns of stock i is calculated as follows; 
p - P 
t t-1 xlOO 
Pt- 1 
where P, is the price of stock i on trading day t and P'_I is its price one 
trading day before that, Similarly, the market return equals to; 
R = KLq - KLCl,_1 X 100 M, KLCl,_, 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for company i is calculated as: 
N 
CARj" = IARi,t 
1;1 
It is important to determine if the announcements convey information to the 
market at all. Following Baek et al. (2001), t-statistics is used to test the 
hypothesis that the average CARs are significantly different from zero at each 
event windows. Results of the t-tests are presented in Table 3. 
We also identify the changes in the company's accounting performance 
such as return on total assets (ROA) calculated as net income available to 
shareholders divided by the total assets, return on operating cashflow (RCF) 
calculated as operating cashflow divided by total assets and debt ratio 
calculated as calculated as long term debt plus short term debt divided by 
the total assets. ROA provides a measure of the efficiency of asset utilization 
(see Lai & Sudarsanam 1997; Zhao 1998) while RCF is useful alternative 
measure of operating performance because operating cash flows are a 
primary component in net - present value (NPV) calculations used to value 
a firm(see Kim et al. 2004), 
Debt ratio has been widely used to measure financial leverage (see 
Demsetz & Villalonga 2001; Gosh & Jain 2000). Changes in other finn's 
characteristics such as board of directors' ownership and level of diversification 
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are also measured to examine whether corporate restructuring does motivate 
finns towards enhancing their corporate governance mechanism through 
board ownership and refocusing. The board of directors' ownership represents 
insider or managerial shareholding in the finn. The influence of board of 
directors' ownership in corporate policy setting and perfonnance has been 
widely debated and documented (see Bethel & Liebeskind 1993; Gibbs 
1993; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Kim et.a!. 2004; McConnell & Servaes 
1990). The finn's level of diversification is measured by revenue- based 
Herfindahl Index computed as the sum of the squares of each segment as a 
proportion of total assets (see Comment & Jarrell 1995) as follows: 
"J.'( IN, J Fj, =:; ~ Xu, ~ Xjjt 
Value of one for Herfindahl index corresponds to very focus or non 
diversified business activities. These changes are nonnally calculated over a 
several-year window surrounding the restructuring event, therefore allowing 
comparisons of post-restructuring accounting perfonnance with the pre-
restructuring perfonnance. In this study, we took an average of two years 
of board of directors' ownership, revenue based Herfindahl index, debt ratio, 
ROA and RCF before aud after the year of restructuring announcement of 
each finn. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As shown in Table I, for Renong Group, both UEM and Renong experienced 
a decrease in ROA and RCF in the post restructuring announcement. For Lion 
Group, Chocolate Product (CP) and Lion Corporation Berhad (LCB) experienced 
an increase in ROA and RCF all perfonnance measures while Lion Industries 
Corporation Berhad (LlCB) and SCB experienced a decrease in ROA and RCF. 
However, ACB experienced an increase in ROA but a decrease in RCF while 
Lion Forest Industries (LFI) experienced a decrease in ROA but an increase 
in RCF. For MRCB Group, all companies experienced an increase in ROA but 
a decrease in RCF. Meanwhile, Time experienced a decrease in both ROA and 
RCF. In other words, not all finns have shown an improvement in average 
ROA and RCF in the post restructuring announcement. 
The restructuring announcements of UEM-Renong Group, Time 
Engineering, MRCB Group and Lion Group were not conveyed to the market 
as shown by insignificant price impacts for all event windows except for 
LlCB and LFI of the Lion Group which showed a negatively significant price 
impact during the announcement. 
TABLE 1. Summary of Performance in Pre and Post Restructuring Period and Announcement Effect on Stock :price 
Group Companies Sector 
Pre to Post Wealth Effect on 
ROA RCF Before Ann During Ann After Ann 
Renong Group UEM Construction Decreased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Renong Construction Decreased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
MRCB Group MRCB Construction Increased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
TV3 Trading and service Increased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
NSTP Trading and service Increased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Time Trading and service Decreased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Lion Group LCB Industrial Product Increased Increased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
ACB Industria1 Product Increased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
LICB Industrial Product Decreased Decreased Insignificant (+ve )significant Insignificant 
SCB Consumer Product Decreased Decreased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
LFI Trading and service Decreased Increased Insignificant (+ve )significant Insignificant 
CP Consumer Product Increased Increased Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Ann= announcement, Before Ann = event window (-30,0), During Ann = event window (-1,+1), After Ann = event window (0,+30). 
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As shown in Table 2, we compared pre- and post-restructuring's debt 
ratio. UEM and Renong experienced higher debt ratios in post restructuring as 
compared with the pre-restructuring period. Time Engineering also experienced 
a higher debt ratio in the post-restructuring period. For the MRCB Group, MRCB 
and TV3 experienced higher debt ratio in the post-period while NSTP experienced 
a lower debt ratio in the post-restructuring period. For the Lion Group, LCB, 
LICB, ACB, SCB and CP experienced higher debt ratios while LFI experienced 
a lower debt ratio in the post-restructuring period. This indicates that overall, 
the corporate restructuring does not motivate the firms towards reducing their 
debt two years after the announcement was made. 
TABLE 2. Summary of Debt Ratio in Pre and Post Corporate 
Restructuring Period 
Group Company Sector Debt ratio (Pre)% Debt ratio (Post)% 
UEM-Renong Renong Construction 61.87 87.10 
UEM Construction 72.54 85.36 
MRCB MRCB Construction 62.66 172.72 
TV3 Trading and service 149.11 73.47 
NSTP Trading and service 66.93 45.60 
Time Time Trading and 
Engineering Engineering service 60.17 95.26 
Lion Group LCB Industrial Product 82.96 97.78 
LICB Industrial Product 60.43 82.39 
ACB Industrial Product 73.97 87.08 
SCB Consumer Product 76.52 97.26 
LFI Trading and service 12.63 6.85 
CP Consumer Product 49.79 52.35 
As shown in Table 3, we compared pre- and post-restructuring's levels 
of diversification based on revenue based Herfindahl index. The evidence 
shows that most of the firms' revenues are more concentrated into few 
business segments, which implies that the corporate restructuring does 
motivate the finns towards refocusing. 
As shown in Table 4, we compared pre- and post-restructuring's 
ownership structure represented by board of directors' ownership (BOD). The 
results show that there are no significant changes in board of directors' 
ownership before and after corporate restructuring for most of the firms. In 
fact, the BOD became smaller. This indicates that the corporate restructuring 
does not motivate the firms towards enhancing their corporate governance 
mechanism through board of directors' ownership. 
TABLE 3. Summary of Revenue Based Herfindahl Index in Pre and Post 
Corporate Restructuring Period 
Group Company Sector Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index 
(pre) (post) 
Renong UEM Construction 0.27 0.43 
Renong Construction 0.20 0.17 
MRCB MRCB Construction 0.28 0.46 
TV3 Trading and Service 0.97 0.94 
NSTP Trading and Service 0.47 0.41 
Time Trading and service 0.28 0.43 
Lion Group LCB Industrial Product 0.43 0.86 
LlCB Industrial Product 0.21 0.76 
ACB Industrial Product 0.21 0.25 
SCB Consumer Product 0.34 0.44 
LFJ Trading and service 0.65 0.63 
CP Consumer Product 0.65 0.82 
TABLE 4. Summary of Board of Director's Ownership in Pre and Post Corporate 
Restructuring Period 
Group Company Sector BOD's ownership BOD's ownership 
(pre) (post) 
UEM-Renong Renong Construction 3.500 3.530 
UEM Construction 23.8 0.000 
MRCB MRCB Construction 0.000 0.000 
TV3 Trading and service 0.000 0.000 
NSTP Trading and service 0.000 0.000 
Time Time Trading and 
Engineering Engineering service 0.000 0.000 
Lion LCB Industrial Product 0.180 0.100 
LlCB Industrial Product 0.112 0.111 
ACB Industrial Product 0.110 0.060 
SCB Consumer Product 0.303 0.090 
LFI Trading and service 0.010 0.000 
CP Consumer Product 0.000 0.000 
Overall, the stock price reactions on the restructuring announcements 
made by the fIrms were not signifIcant. The fact that these fIrms were 
actually facing debt restructuring to enable them to reduce their fInancial 
Corporate Restructuring: Firm Characteristics and Performance 13'fJ 
commitment might not be attractive to the market. Most of the finns were 
characterised by considerably high average debt ratio prior to restructuring. 
The finns also exhibit different levels of efficiency with respect to generating 
profit and cash flow when measured in ROA and RCF respectively. Some 
finns consistently showed a decrease in both ROA and RCF such as UEM. 
Renong, Time, LlCB and SCB while some finns consistently showed an 
increase in both ROA and RCF such as LCB and CB. Other finns such as MRCB, 
Tv3, NSTP, ACB and LFI showed mixed results two years after the restructuring 
announcement was made. 
Surprisingly, all finns except for LlCB and LFI experienced a higher debt 
ratio in the post-restructuring period though these finns were forced to 
restructure due to higher debt. In other words, theoretically we should 
expect the leverage ratios of these firms to be reduced in the post-
restructuring period. There are two possible reasons for the increase in debt. 
First, equity issuance may not be an attractive way to raise funds since these 
finns were perceived to be troubled finns. Second, some finns became part 
of the vehicle to raise debt to enable survival of other finns who were not 
able to raise debt for their excessive current debt obligations. As a result, the 
'vehicle' firm(s) experienced a higher debt ratio in the post-restructuring 
period. 
Refocusing or reducing diversification is argued to be one of the reasons 
for firms to restructure. Surprisingly, UEM, Renong, NSTP, ACB and SCB did 
not show a drastic turnaround strategy to be less diversified in the post-
restructuring period while MRCB and Time Engineering showed more effort 
to become less diversified. LCB and LlCB appeared to be more focused while 
TV3 remained focused in the post-restructuring period. 
In the context of ownership structure, only UEM showed an increase in 
board of directors' ownership percentage. If an increase in board of 
directors' ownership percentage is expected to bring greater monitoring 
effect and a reduction in agency cost as argued in the literature, we should 
expect all firms to consider increasing their board of directors' ownership 
two years after the restructuring announcement. This indicates that aligning 
the interest of management to shareholders was viewed to be insignificant 
in ensuring these troubled firms improve their performance. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the stock price reactions on the restructuring announcements 
made by the firms were not significant and mixed results on accounting 
performance measured in ROA and ReF. These firms have also shown some 
changes in firm specific characteristics in terms of financial leverage 
measured in debt ratio, level of diversification measured in revenue based 
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Herfmdahl Index and corporate governance mechanism via board of directors' 
ownership following to the corporate restructuring announcement. The 
motives for corporate restructuring were inconclusive for all firms since not 
all post restructuring outcomes were consistent with the argument that 
corporate restructuring should result in more focus, improved corporate 
governance through insider ownership and better debt management ratio. 
The implication of these findings is that corporate restructuring framework 
in Malaysia does not really focus to further strengthening the role of board 
of directors through board of directors' ownership, emphasizing corporate 
refocusing and reducing debt in the post restructuring period . Since this 
paper revealed the descriptive and event study results, further research is 
recommended to test on the relationships between firm's characteristics and 
the likelihood of corporate restructuring and the relationship between post 
firm characteristics and post restructuring performance. 
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